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Environmental Law—Consideration Must Be Given .
 to Ecological
Matters in Federal Agency Decisions—Zabel v. Tabb.i—Plaintiffs-
appellees (hereinafter the Landholders), Zabel and Russell, owned
riparian land on the Boca Ciega Bay in Florida, and adjacent land
underlying the navigable waters of the Bay. The Landholders sought
to dredge and fill their property for the construction of a trailer camp.
After having obtained approval from local and state agencies having
jurisdiction to prohibit their work,2 the Landholders applied to the
Army Corps of Engineers for a federal permits After a public hearing, 4
the Secretary of the Army denied the application. 5 The Landholders
1 Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 1971).
2 The Landholders received significant public opposition to their work. After con-
sidering the negative recommendations of a number of groups, including the Board of
County Commissioners of Pinellas County, the Health Board of Pinellas County, the
United States Fish & Wildlife Service, the Florida Board of Conservation, the Trustees
of the Internal Improvement . Fund of the State of Florida, the Central and South Florida
Flood Control District, the Board of Pilot Commissioners for the Port of St. Petersburg,
and about 700 private residents, the Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control
Authority rejected the Landholders' permit application, and this determination was
upheld in an unpublished opinion of the state circuit court. In Zabel v. Pinellas County
Water & Navigation Control Authority, 154 So.2d 181 (Fla, 1963), a Florida District
Court of Appeals affirmed that determination. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Florida reversed, 171 Sold 376 (Fla. 1965), holding that the burden of proving the
potentially adverse effects of the project fell to the defendant, and that, since that burden
had not been met, to allow the lower court decision to stand would be a taking without
compensation. The District Court of Appeals adopted the opinion of the Supreme Court
and remanded the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with
the Supreme Court's ruling. The circuit court directed the Authority to issue the permit,
and the Authority appealed to the District Court of Appeals, 179 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1965).
That court affirmed and directed issuance of the permit notwithstanding the appellant's
contention that the Supreme Court of Florida's ruling had intended further proceedings
on the application.
3
 Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U.S. 410, 431 (1903), requires that prior to submitting
an application for a federal permit, the consent and approval of all local and state
agencies having authority to prohibit the proposed work must be obtained.
4 A public hearing was held in St. Petersburg in November, 1966, where public
concern over the Landholders' project was clearly expressed. One month later, the
District Engineer at Jacksonville, Florida, Colonel Tabb, basing his conclusions upon the
public hearing, recommended denial of the application. The Division Engineer, and
later the Chief of Engineers, concurred in that recommendation to the Secretary of the
Army. 430 F.2d at 202.
5 On February 28, 1967, the Secretary of the Army, Stanley R. Resor, denied the
Landholders' application because issuance of the requested permit:
1. Would result in a distinctly harmful effect on the fish and wildlife resources
in Boca Ciega Bay,
2, Would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act of 1958, as amended (16 U.S.C. 662),
3. Is opposed by the Florida Board of Conservation on behalf of the State of
Florida, and by the County Health Board of Pinellas County and the Board of
County Commissioners of Pinellas County, and
4. Would be contrary to the public interest.
Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764, 766-67 (MD. Fla. 1969).
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instituted suit in federal district court° for review of the Secretary's
determination and for a court order compelling him to issue a permit.
They argued that the proposed dredging and filling would not interfere
with navigation,'' and that the Secretary had no authority to withhold
a permit on non-navigational grounds. 8 Defendants-appellants (herein-
after the Government)° supported their decision to deny the permit
request on authority of Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropri-
ation Act," and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.' Following
denial of the Government's motion for lack of jurisdiction, the district
court granted the Landholders' pretrial conference motion for summary
judgment." The Secretary of the Army was directed to issue the per-
mit, and the Government was enjoined from interfering with the
dredging and filling operations." The Government appealed the deci-
sion to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.' That court vacated
the injunction of the district court, reversed the summary judgment,
and rendered judgment for the Government. The court of appeals
HELD: that the Secretary of the Army was within his statutory man-
date when he denied the Landholders' permit application for other than
navigational considerations.
The Zabel case is noteworthy because a court has, for the first
time, recognized ecological preservation as a legitimate rationale for a
permit denial by a federal agency. Justification for the denial is found
in both the specific language of the governing statutory provisions, and
in various directives which indicate a general governmental policy of
environmental conservation. The opinion is divided into two sections.
In the first, the court extended the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act test of "interference with navigation," to include permit refusal
based on ecological factors within the broad discretionary mandate of
the statute. In the second section, the court highlighted other statutory
6 Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
7 Defendants admitted in discovery proceedings that the District Engineer found
that, "[t]he proposed work would have no material adverse effect on navigation." 296
F. Supp. at 766. In fact, he found that the proposed project might indeed have positive
effects: "Navigation, present or prospective; . . . the proposed fill would improve water
depths in the immediate area .. f Tlhe dredging [done in the past) has also improved
navigation conditions in the same area." Id.
8 The Landholders did stipulate, however, that the landfill might harm the ecology
or marine life in the Bay area, but maintained that such effects were irrelevant to the
proper test for permit approval. 296 F. Supp. at 767.
9 Those joined as defendants-appellants were Colonel R. P. Tabb of the Corps of
Engineers; Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army; and the United States of America.
10 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964), which gives the Secretary of the Army discretion to issue
permits.
11 16 U.S.C. §f 661, 662(a) (1964). These sections require the Secretary of the
Army to consult federal and state conservation agencies before issuing a permit to dredge
and fill.
12 430 F.2d at 201.
18 The district court then granted the Government's plea for a stay of execution
until this appeal had been adjudicated. 296 F. Supp. at 771.
14 Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
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provisions, recent executive orders, and congressional conference re-
ports, which, when viewed as a totality reveal an unmistakeable govern-
mental policy of environmental control authorizing the Secretary of the
Army to deny the Landholders' permit application. This casenote will
analyze these major sections of the court's opinion, and will consider
the question of whether Congress possesses the power to regulate the
use of the nation's natural resources. Further, the ecological significance
of the opinion and its importance for future federal agency regulatory
standards will be examined.
The Landholders sought a judgment based on the misuse of fed-
eral power. They alleged that the Submerged Lands Act" heralded the
abandonment of the congressional power to regulate natural resources."
Analysis of case law, however, as well as the congressional intent
expressed in the legislative history of the Submerged Lands Act, support
the court's refusal to allow the Landholders' claim that the authority to
control navigable waters is presently vested solely in the several states.
The court of appeals considered United States v. Rands,u in
which the plaintiff owned land along the Columbia River in Oregon,
which land 'the government had condemned for use in a lock and dam
project. Rands sought compensation for the land's special value as a
port site. The court held that the United States was operating within its
power to control navigable waters, and that the government, through
the Submerged Lands Act, did not release any of its rights arising under
the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate flood control, navi-
gation, or the production of power." The Zabel court's reliance upon
Rands was proper. In both cases the land owners claimed that the Sub-
merged Lands Act altered congressional power to regulate the use of
private property." The Rands court rejected this argument with little
hesitation. "The [Submerged Lands Act] left congressional power over
commerce and the dominant navigational servitude of the United States
precisely where it found them.""
Should any doubt remain concerning the propriety of Congress'
right to act, an examination of the legislative history of the Submerged
Lands Act extinguishes that reservation. Speaking on the issue of fed-
eral governmental authority, the House Report states: "[The Sub-
merged Lands Act] does not affect any of the Federal constitutional
powers of regulation and control over these areas within State bound-
aries."2' (Emphasis added.)
The court, therefore, went on to analyze the statutory mandate of
16 43 U.S.C. {I 1301 (1964).
10 430 F.2d at 204.
IT 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
18 Id. at 127.
19
 The Commerce Clause reads in part: "The Congress shall have power . . . To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes . . . ." U.S. Coast. art. I, { 8.
20 389 U.S. at 127.
21
 1953 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1385, 1389.
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Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act. 22 At issue was
whether the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act allows the Secre-
tary of the Army to refuse permission for proposed projects on other
than navigational grounds. The Act, in pertinent part, reads:
The creation of any obstruction . . . to the navigable capacity
of any waters of the United States is prohibited . . . and it
shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter
or modify the course ... of the channel of any navigable water
of the United States, unless the work has been recommended
by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of
the Army prior to beginning the same 2 3
The court interpreted this passage as authorizing full discretionary
power to the Secretary, up to and including the decision as to whether
designated conservation standards must be met to make a proposed
project acceptable. 24
 However, had the court looked at the entire
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, rather than merely Section 10,
the congressional intent that permission be extended or withheld solely
on navigational grounds would have been clear to the court. The com-
plete Act 25
 is noticeably centered around eliminating obstructions and
preventing capacity changes of the nation's waterways. The frame of
reference of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act is made clear by
its heading in the Statutes at Large as "An Act Making appropriations
for the construction, repair, and preservation of certain public works on
rivers and harbors . . . . "26
 Section 9 of the Act, the one directly pre-
ceding the section in which the court found broad discretionary author-
ity, further reinforces the over-all navigational foundation of the Act:
That it shall not be lawful to construct ... any bridge, dam,
dike, or causeway over or in any port, roadstead, haven,
harbor, canal, navigable river, or other navigable water of the
United States until the . . . plans have been approved by the
Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of War. . . ."
The court, however, ignored the intent expressed by the entire pub-
lic act, and instead looked to case law for authority to deny a permit on
ecological grounds. Its decision was based in large measure upon United
States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern," where the Secretary denied a permit
for essentially fiscal and navigational reasons. In Greathouse, peti-
tioners sought to build a wharf on land which the government was
22 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964).
28 Id.
24
 The court believed that the statute had never before been interpreted on this
matter of justifiable criteria for permit denial. "Until now there has been no absolute
answer to this question." 430 F.2d at 207.
25 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121-161.
28 Id. at 1121.
27 Id. at 1151.
28 289 U.S. 352 (1933).
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planning to take through eminent domain for use as an access to a
future parkway. The proposed wharf would not have interfered with
navigation. The court refused to allow a writ of mandamus compelling
issuance of the permit, holding that equity would not tolerate the
building of a wharf which would, of necessity, immediately be destroyed
and paid for by the government. The decision makes no mention of the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act as authority for the denial, but
rather rests entirely upon equitable principles which militate against
the use of mandamus to carry out an idle and wasted venture." In fact,
the court states quite plainly that Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act need not be considered at all because financial
equities govern the decision:
It is apparent that petitioners are entitled to the relief prayed
only if several doubtful questions are resolved in their favor.
They are (1) whether a mandatory duty is imposed upon the
Secretary of War by section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act to authorize the construction of the
proposed wharf if he is satisfied that it will not interfere with
navigation. . . .
But we find it unnecessary, in the circumstances of this
case, to say what effect should be given to these objections
alone, whether considered each separately or together. Al-
though the remedy by mandamus is at law, its allowance is
controlled by equitable principles . . . . The apparent conse-
quences of authorizing the construction of the wharf would be
only to increase the expense to the government.. . . 80
The Zabel court, however, disregarded this language and used
Greathouse to extend the test of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act beyond its intended navigational strictures. Had Greathouse been
included purely as an example of the circumstances in which non-
navigational permit standards operated, rather than as an extension of
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, its use, while still inappli-
cable to Zabel, would have at least been accurate. However, the court
does in fact cite Greathouse with specific reference to the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act.".
The Zabel court discussed Citizens Committee for the Hudson
Valley v. Volpe82 as reinforcement for its interpretation of Greathouse.
In Hudson Valley, the state sought a landfill permit as the initial step in
the eventual completion of a massive causeway project. The District
28 Id. at 360.
80 Id. at 357, 359, 360.
81 "In fact, in most cases under the Rivers and Harbors Act the Courts have been
faced only with navigation problems ... .
One very big exception is United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern." 430 F.2d at
207-08.
82 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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Court for the Southern District of New York invalidated the permit
issued by the Corps of Engineers, holding that the Corps had an obliga-
tion to consider and recognize the reality of the entire expressway. If
undertaken by the state, the landfill project would have made the
completion of the larger project economically imperative to avoid the
expense of the fill being totally wasted. The court, straying from a
navigational vacuum, ruled that the Corps of Engineers could no longer
remain oblivious to the very real economics involved.
The Zabel court moved from the essentially financial, commercial
tests of the Greathouse and Hudson Valley decisions, to a much
broader, purely discretionary standard which includes environmental
priorities. It is submitted that the court's expansion of the test is
improper. Both decisions were closely related to commerce and oper-
ated within solely fiscal confines. Zabel does not. In both instances, the
court's enforcement of the denial of a permit, while strictly on non-
navigational grounds, still involved a deviation from ptire navigation
which was imperceptible when set beside the overhauling of the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act effectuated by the Zabel court. The
Statutes at Large demonstrate" a clear navigational framework which
is nothing more than explicit protections for governmental commerce
on the nation's waterways. To go from that posture to a wider commer-
cial, financial protection which includes non-navigational operations,"
is quite different, and significantly milder and more workable than what
the Zabel court has done. Unless the court can uncover the current
standard from within the statute, then there exist no guidelines at all by
which administrators remain bound. The Zabel court has indulged itself
in judicial overkill which, as has been shown, the complete Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act and the relevant case law militate against.
It is submitted that the second half of the opinion quite adequately
justifies the reversal of the district court and renders the first part of the
opinion superfluous.
In the second half of its opinion, the court approved the Secretary's
action on grounds outside the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act.
Citing other statutory provisions that require inter-agency consultation
and ecological prudence, the court went on to state that when the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act is read in pari materia with other
statutorially founded governmental policy, the Secretary's power to
deny the dredge and fill application is clearly established.
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act" (hereinafter the Wildlife
Act) is relied upon by the court to demonstrate the position which other
statutes adopt relative to the nation's conservation resources. The
Wildlife Act requires the Corps of Engineers to consult with the Fish
and Wildlife Service with a view towards preventing loss and damage to
wildlife resources. The Wildlife Act states:
88 See notes 24 and 25 supra.
34 See p. 677 supra.
83 16 U.S.C.	 661-66c (1964).
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[W] henever the waters of any stream or other body of water
are proposed or authorized to be ... modified for any purpose
whatever . . . by any public or private agency under Federal
permit or license, such department or agency first shall
consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service,
Department of the Interior ... with a view to the conservation
of wildlife resources. .
This language evidences the congressional intent that the natural
resources of the nation be administered on a comprehensive and coordi-
nated basis.37 The Zabel court recognized this, and correctly reversed
the district court on this issue. The district court was left unconvinced
by the language of the Wildlife Act, and suggested that it applied only
to permit applications for large federal projects." The lower court
expressed fears of procedural confusion and a resultant lack of due
process if private projects were included within the scope of the
Wildlife Act." That is, the district court felt the Wildlife Act was
unclear relative to private non-federal projects, and was unwilling
under those circumstances to allow, under the aegis of the Wildlife Act,
what it termed a taking of private property through the exercise of
police power."
The court of appeals rejected this argument on the basis of Section
662 (h) of the Wildlife Act which specifically outlines the areas excluded
from the Act and makes no mention whatever of private land projects."
The language of the Wildlife Act is explicit: inter-agency consulation
is required in private as well as public land permit applications." This
is not to say that the Fish and Wildlife Service possesses veto powers,"
but only that through conference with the Corps of Engineers, it may
exert influence, as it did in Zabel, and that the Corps, when making its
ultimate decision on the permit request, can adhere to the Service's
recommendations. The court did not suggest that conservationists must
prevail, but rather they must be consulted regularly, and that it is
39 Id. § 662(a) (1964).
87 See Brief for Appellants at 25, Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
38 296 F. Supp. at 769.
39 Id. at 771.
40 296 F. Supp. at 769. Interestingly enough, the brief filed for the Landholders on
this appeal barely mentions this problem and relies almost entirely upon the supremacy
of the Submerged Lands Act, a theory quickly rejected by the Zabel Court.
41 The provisions of section 661-666c of this title shall not he applicable to
those projects for the impoundment of water where the maximum surface area
for such impoundments is less than ten acres, nor to activities for or in connec-
tion with programs primarily for land management and use carried out by
Federal agencies with respect to Federal lands under their jurisdiction.
16 U.S.C. § 662(h) (1964).
42 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1964).
43 "The latter [i.e., the fish and wildlife conservation agencies) would not be given
any veto power over any part of the water resources development program." 1958
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3451.
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within the agency's discretion to implement their advice through permit
refusals based solely upon environmental safeguards.
The court examined the legislative history to document its conclu-
sions regarding the Wildlife Act, The portions of the Senate Report
which the court extracted, give the mistaken impression that the
Wildlife Act requires inter-agency collaboration only in the interests of
commerce:
[E]xisting law [the laws which the Wildlife Act superceded]
has no application whatsoever to the dredging and filling of
bays and estuaries by private interests. • . . This is a particu-
larly serious deficiency from the standpoint of commercial
fishing interests . . . . The bays . . . are highly important as
spawning and nursery grounds for many commercial species
of fish and shellfish."
If the legislative history quoted by the court were representative of the
congressional intent when enacting the Wildlife Act, then Zabel would
not fall within its purview because the Landholders were not accused of
causing a loss or reduction of commerce: The court would have been
wiser either to ignore the Senate Report, and let the Wildlife Act speak
for itself, or to choose one of the many passages representing the
ecological spirit of the law. 45
In addition to the Wildlife Act, the court introduced the demands
of the National Environmental Policy Act" (hereinafter the Environ-
mental Act) upon the decision. It is submitted that this Act alone is
sufficient to justify a permit denial on ecological grounds. The Environ-
mental Act leaves little doubt that Congress has gone beyond equivoca-
tion on environmental matters. The Act is to be enforced "to the fullest
extent possible . . . [to all] . . . policies, regulations, and public laws of
the United States [and is to be applied to] . . . all agencies of the
Federal Government."' The entire Act is important, but Section 101
44 Id. at 3450.
45 E.g .,
Not all of the recreational benefits from fish and wildlife accrue to those
who hunt and fish. It has been estimated, for example, that 66 million people
find recreation and release from tension in wildlife photography, bird watching,
and other forms of nature study based on fish and wildlife resources.
. • .
Fish and wildlife species, Iike other living things, need land and water. Adequate
provision must be made . . . .
• • • .
The conservation agencies are restricted and hampered by this lack of authority
[prior to this Act], particularly where the land acquisition necessary for flood
control and other so-called primary purposes of projects results in little or no
land being available for conservation purposes. 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3448-450.
40
 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, P.L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C.A. jji 4331-347
(March, 1970 U.S.CA. pamphlet).
47 Id. at p 4332.
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outlines the philosophy of this declaration of national environmental
policy:
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's
activity on the inter-relations of all components of the natural
environment ... declares that it is the continuing policy of the
Federal Government . . . to use all practicable means and
measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony ..
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter,
it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government
to use all practicable means . . . to the end that the Nation
may—
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive,
and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the en-
vironment without . . . undesirable and unintended con-
sequences;
(4) preserve important . . . natural aspects of our na-
tional heritage, and maintain . . . an environment which
supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource
use ...; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and
approach the maximum attainable recycling of deplet-
able resources.
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy
a healthful environment and that each person has a respon-
sibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of
the environment.48
The Environmental Act is the most pervasive declaration of envi-
ronmental concern that has ever emanated from Congress. Its applica-
bility to the facts in Zabel is clearly appropriate in light of the
statements in the Act requiring federal agencies and individual citizens
to exercise caution and responsibility in environmental matters. The
Act firmly settles, as the legislative history displays, the issue of the
propriety of environmental-based agency decisions: "[The Act] would
provide all agencies with a legislative mandate and a responsibility to
consider the consequences of their actions on the environment.'
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, and other public laws and Presidential orders since
48 Id. at § 4331.
40 S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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the Environmental Act," show an unmistakable joint legislative-execu-
tive concern for the environment, and leave little doubt as to the pro-
priety of the Secretary's decision in this case. The Zabel case is a
landmark decision because it is the first judicial formulation of a
principle which sanctions strict agency vigilance over natural resources.
Zabel will be cited in the future for the proposition that agency decision
making must reflect careful contemplation of the effect its action will
have upon the environment. The Zabel court, in a somewhat unwieldly
and at times imprecise manner, has fashioned a new and important
standard for federal regulatory authorities. Responding to the severity
of the ecological problems the society faces, the court now demands a
less callous and frivolous environmental posture from government
agencies. In effect, another factor has been added to the equation by
which regulatory bodies will make their decisions. The court recognized
that its holding had, in fact, begun a new era in this field:
The agency was entitled to deny that which might have been
granted routinely five, ten, fifteen years ago before man's ex-
plosive increase made all, including Congress, aware of civili-
zation's potential destruction from breathing its own polluted
air and drinking its own infected water and the unmeasurable
loss from a silent-spring-like disturbance of nature's econ-
omy.'
The case also highlights the effect public sentiment can occasion-
ally have upon government agencies and the judiciary. While the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act omits entirely the opinions of the
citizenry in the decision-making process, the District Engineer chose
to listen to the community:
Careful consideration has been given to the general public
interest in this case. The virtually unanimous opposition to
the proposed work . . . convinced me that approval of the
application would not be in the public interest."
50 Two of the more significant additions are: (1) Environment Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970, P. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, Title II $ 202, in which it states that
"the Congress declares that there is a national policy for the environment which provides
for the enhancement of environmental quality . • ." March 17 to April 16, 1970 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 568. The Act's purpose is "to assure that each Federal department
and agency conducting or supporting public works activities which affect the environment
shall implement the policies established under existing law... ." Id. (The reference dearly
being to the oft referred to, less oft enforced, National Environmental Policy Act.)
(2) Exec. Order No. 11,507, 35 Fed. Reg. 2573 (February 4, 1970). Prevention,
Control, and Abatement of Air and Water Pollution at Federal Facilities:
§ 3(a) Heads of agencies shall , . • (2) direct particular attention to identifying
potential ... water quality problems ... and make provisions for their preven-
tion . . . 4(a) Heads of agencies shall insure that . . . (4) the use, storage,
and handling of all materials ... shall be carried out so as to avoid or minimize
the possibilities for water and air pollution....
131
 430 F.2d at 201.
52
 Id. at 202, quoting Col. Tabb's recommendation to his superiors.
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The Zabel court, by respecting that determination, judicially mani-
fested that the people possess a degree of self-control over their
environment. The court, however, at no point specifically acknowledges
the people's right to be properly informed and heard. While such
interests were not vital to this case, and while the Corps did act
responsibly here, the court, in dicta, could have gone a step towards
transforming federal agencies from their normal position of low visibil-
ity, into responsive organs that recognize the public claim to access to
the decision-making process. Specifically, the issue focuses upon the
problem of public ignorance of administrative activity. While the
Environmental Act does require public reports from agencies on con-
duct which could effect the environment," the determination of when to
issue these reports is internal, thus producing a system of self-analysis
which inevitably leads to reduced feedback to the community." Prior
notice to the public and all persons and organizations affected by the
agency conduct ought to be required," giving those who desire to be
heard an opportunity to object to, support, or propose alternative
agency conduct.
Despite its flaws, the ultimate significance of the Zabel opinion
could be immense. If followed and developed the decision will provide
the judicial foundation for an ecosystems approach to the national land
policy"—an approach which considers and protects the non-human
elements of the environment to form an ecological community unit.
That is, as a matter of survival, the present indiscriminate rape of
wildlife resources would give way to scientific public management of the
environment. Such a land policy would necessarily impose constraints
upon single-purpose approaches such as the Landholders exhibited in
Zabel. This is not to say that the court, by adopting an ecosystems
policy, was neglecting private commercial interests, but rather that they
recognized the impoverishment of an environment means the impover-
53 42 US.C.A. § 4332(c) (March, 1970 U.S.C.A. pamphlet).
54 See Forkosch, Administrative Conduct in Environmental Areas—A Suggested
Degree of Public Control, 12 S. Tex. L.J. I (1970).
55 Agencies should be required by Congress to publish in trade papers and local
daily papers, news of their current activity. Public announcements ought to be issued
on a regular schedule, as well as in emergency situations.
58 Senator Henry Jackson introduced in the Senate on January 29, 1970, the Na-
tional Land Use Policy Act of 1970 (S. 3354). The bill would establish a grant-in-aid
program to assist state and local governments in land-use planning; encourage states to
implement recreational, industrial, and environmental land-use plans; and increase the
federal government's responsibility in the area of land-use planning. The bill recognizes a
. . . continuing responsibility of the Federal Government ... to undertake the
development of a national policy, to be known as the national land-use policy,
which shall incorporate ecological, esthetic, environmental, economic, social and
other appropriate factors. Such a policy shall serve as a guide in making specific
decisions at the national level . . . and shall provide a framework for develop-
ment of interstate, State, and local land use policy . . . [which shall] favor
patterns of Iand use planning, management, and development which are In
accord with sound ecological principles . . . .
116 Cong. Rec. S 839 Wally ed. Jan. 29, 1970) [teat of bill begins S 838].
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ishment of all those dependent upon it. To prevent submerged land
from being dredged and filled for trailer camps, as the Zabel court has
done, is not to prefer shellfish to people. It is rather to prefer the
interests of the whole society, present and future, over those that would
jeopardize the ecosystem for immediate gain. The Zabel court is not
advocating environmental maintenance as an end unto itself, or re-
quiring man to seek out nature's purpose and adapt himself accordingly,
but rather it is simply explaining that wise use of our resources is an
ongoing imperative." In recognition of this, the Zabel court, by
demanding environmental watchfulness from federal agencies, has
presented us with an enlightened and timely judicial decision.
WILLIAM A. GOLDSTEIN
67 See note 50 supra.
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